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Gardner: <em>When Your Number’s Up</em> [Review]

as Nigel Hamilton used for the
title of the second volume of his
Montgomery biography.
Simonds, according to
Granatstein, was "the best soldier
Canada has produced in the
Second World War." Suchastrong
categorical statement has been
assailed in some quarters among
Canadian historians. The general
consensus seems to be that
although that may be true, it also
left much to be desired. There is
no mention of Simonds' role in the
closing stages of the war in the
Rhineland. In fighting that was
reminiscent of Flanders, the
two-pronged attack was delayed
until the start of February so that
armoured mobility was lost in
the mud while air support was
reduced by cloud and poor
visibility. Startling mistakes were
made by usually reliable
commanders. Some contend that
Simonds allowed his rivalry with the
popular Horrocks to lead him into
murderous and needless fighting.
The point is moot to this day.
My allotted space does not
allow me to do justice to this very
worthwhile book. There are lapses
as has been pointed out. Some
generals receive treatment that is
cursory at best (Foulkes, Kitching,
Worthington) while others whose
careers were spectacular and
successful (Holly Keefler) leave the
reader like Oliver Twist asking for
"More please, sir!"
The section of the political
generals, particularly Maurice
Pope, are thought-provoking and
disturbingly prophetic. Pope's
remarkable loyalty and clearheadedness deserve to be better
known. This dovetails nicely into
Granatstein's candid and wellbalanced treatment of the
absence of French-Canadian
generals. His interpretation of Ken
Stuart's role in this situation is
debatable as was his involvement in

the manpower shortage crisis. It is
revealing to read Crerar's opinion
of General La Fleche as being
"entirely unmoral ... very dangerous
. . . an utter egomaniac." In the
light of what has been revealed
about Crerar himself, this is a
clear case of "the pot calling the
kettle black."
Granatstein concludes that
Canada's "share of victory owed
more to the common soldiers than
to the generals." Nevertheless,
victory could not have been
achieved without the generals who
because of their "psychological
colonial status" were "condemned
to practise deference to their
betters and control in the
presence of subordinates."
Specialists may and will quibble
with Granatstein on some or many
points but most will be satisfied,
even impressed, generally.
Gil Drolet

*****

When Your
Number's Up
The Canadian Soldier in
the First World War
Desmond Morton. When Your
Number's Up: The Canadian
Soldier in the First World War,
(Toronto: Random House, 1993)
354 pages, $32.50.
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hile the exploits of the
Canadian Expeditionary
Force at Vimy Ridge, St. Julien
and elsewhere along the Western
Front have been documented
thoroughly, the individuals who
made up the ranks of the CEF
have not been considered in any
great depth. With this intent in
mind Desmond Morton has

writtenhislatestbook, When Your
Number's Up, which examines
these Canadian soldiers and "the
factors that shaped their lives and
hastened their deaths." [p.vii] .
The study is informed by an
impressive array of existing
scholarship on the First World
War, much of it Morton's own
work. In addition, the author has
examined a wide variety of primary
material, including diaries, letters
and correspondence of Canadian
soldiers. He is thus able to capture,
in an anecdotal fashion, the
experiences ofthese men, thereby
providing a uniquely personal
perspective on Canada's role in
the conflict.
Morton begins his study by
assessing the nation's response to
the outbreak of hostilities in 1914,
noting that for most Canadians,
war seemed "a remote, romantic
adventure." He illustrates the
unbridled fervour which characterized the first weeks of the war
in Canada, culminating with the
departure of the First Contingent
of the CEF in early October. As
recruiting continued, however, it
gradually became apparent that
Canadian enthusiasm for military
service had its limits. Sam
Hughes' Department of Militia was
soon forced to resort to increasingly
imaginative recruiting schemes.
By the fall of 1915, Morton
suggests, somewhat charitably,
"Anyone with a bright idea and
access to the Minister" could
organize a battalion for overseas
service. [p.57] Judging by the
turmoil thatensuedinmanyparts
of the country, it would seem that
"bright" ideas were not always
a necessity.
Despite spirited recruiting
efforts, Morton maintains that by
late 1916 the well of volunteers
had largely run dry. He discusses
the unrest that accompanied
conscription, noting that while
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compulsory service has since been
condemned as a needless and
oppressive, such charges are
largely the product of hindsight.
Indeed, had the war continued
until 1920, as the Allies
anticipated, the necessity of
conscription would have been
quite evident. Morton follows
the soldiers of the CEF in their
preparations for war, arguing
that much of their training in the
first years of the conflict was of
limited value. He recounts the
experience of one Canadian
corporal on manouveures in
England, who, after ordering his
section to crawl forward to
capture a machine-gun post, was
informed by a reproachful staff
officer that "No British soldier
crawls into battle on his belly!"
[p.90] Both in Canada and
England, the training regimen
proved woefully inadequate for the
grim conditions that the soldiers
would encounter at the front.
While insufficient training
coupled with inexperience often
led to disastrous losses early in
the war, Morton argues that as
the conflict progressed, the CEF was
able to develop effective tactics.
Mter the devastating experience of
the Somme, a battle characterized
by Canadian soldier Frank
Maheux as "worse than hell," the
author contends that a tactical
"revolution" took place as the
Canadian Corps regrouped in
front of Vimy Ridge. With the
refocussing of tactics at the
platoon level, Morton suggests
that "Canadian infantry would be
organized and trained to fight their
own battles and not be patriotic
automata." [p.164] As the war
progressed, Canadian success
increased as the infantry improved
upon its new tactics of fire and
movement. At the same time, the
artillery "mastered a practical
science," with devastating effects.

In addition to tactics, Morton
explores some of the bleaker
realities facing Canadian soldiers.
Perhaps the most graphic section
of the book addresses the nature
of wounds and diseases at the
front. Relying on the accounts of
soldiers, surgeons and nurses,
complemented by several rather
chilling photographs, Morton
relates clearly the grisly assortment
of fates that befell many men.
Prisoners of war suffered under
dreadful conditions as well. While in
theory they were protected by the
dictates of the Geneva Convention,
the author demonstrates that
captured Canadian soldiers were
often mistreated and malnourished
by their captors.
Morton concludes his study on
a bitter note, with a discussion of
the reintegration of the members
of the CEF into Canadian society
at the end of the war. The author
is critical of the response to the
needs of veterans, noting that
while programs were devised for
the rehabilitation of many soldiers,
such plans soon fell by the
wayside as Canadians found more
pressing problems. With the
depression of 1921, funds for
disabled veterans' jobs all but
disappeared. As Morton notes
caustically: "Employing them had
tumed out to be more patriotic
than profitable." [p.271]
I:q addition to providing a vivid
portrayal of the experiences of the
soldiers who comprised the CEF,
Desmond Morton has captured
the changing nature of the war in
which they fought. Throughout
the book, the author emphasizes
the evolution in the conditions
faced by soldiers at the front, in
the tactics they employed in
battle, and in the nature of the
Canadian society from which they
emerged. It should be noted that
the study relies heavily on the
author's previous work in this

area. Readers familiar with
Morton's many studies of the CEF
and Bill Rawling's recent book on
tactics will find that When Your
Number's Up contains few new
revelations regarding the
Canadian experience in the war.
Nonetheless, the book provides
intriguing glimpses of many
aspects of the struggle through
the eyes of Canadians who
participated, at the same time
helping to dispel the misleading
image of the First World War as a
static and meaningless conflict.
Nick Gardner
University of Calgary

*****

Achilles in Vietnam
Combat Trauma and the
Undoing of Character
Jonathan Shay, MD, Ph.D. Achilles
in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and
the Undoing of Character. (New

York: Atheneum, 1994)
pages, $20.00 US
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onathan Shay has written
a remarkable book. This book
is at once erudite, eloquent and
outspoken. Even though Canada
was not involved in the prosecution
of the Vietnam War, it is a book
which should be read by every
officer or non-commissioned
officer who commands, will
command, or intends to
command, troops in battle. For
them, this is a very important
type to which they are not
normally exposed by their training.
This is also a text that will have
great value to officers and NCOs
who are expected to be employed
in peacekeeping duty, a duty for
which Canada is justly famous
worldwide. This observation is
made not because of Dr. Shay's

J
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